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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20050179-CA 
JERIMIALBISTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in the First Judicial District, Cache County, the 
Honorable Thomas L. Willmore presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G).1 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where defendant had an extensive criminal history and where the plea 
agreement had disposed of two other first degree felony charges, did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to reduce her conviction 
from a first degree to a second degree felony? 
This brief will cite to the current version of the Utah Code when there have been 
no amendments relevant to defendant's claims. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to 
reduce a conviction for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 32, 25 
P.3d985. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, having been previously convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance, was charged by information with possession with intent to distribute in a drug-
free zone, a first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii). Rl . 
Defendant pled guilty. R28. In exchange, the State agreed to reduce a first degree felony 
charge in a separate case and to dismiss a first degree felony charge in a third case. R35; 
Sentencing Transcript (ST) at 12. 
Prior to sentencing, defendant moved the court for an order reducing her 
conviction from a first degree to a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402. R47. On January 24, 2005, the trial court denied defendant's motion and 
imposed sentence. R51-52, 54. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison 
term of five years to life. R51. 
Defendant timely appealed. R63. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On two separate occasions, "having previously been convicted of unlawful 
possession or use a controlled substance," defendant "did knowingly and intentionally 
possess or use methamphetamine, within 1000 feet of a public parking lot." R31. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
her motion to reduce her conviction. The trial court considered all legally relevant 
factors. The sentence was neither inherently unfair nor excessive. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE HER 
CONVICTION 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court[] abused its discretion in denying [her] 
request to reduce her first degree felony to a second degree felony, pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 76-3-402." Br. Appellant at 6. Defendant further claims that the sentence in this case 
"was unduly harsh, or clearly excessive," because (1) she had "voluntarily participated in 
counseling while incarcerated," had "expressed a sincere desire to address her drug 
addiction," and "had never previously been committed to prison"; (2) individuals 
convicted of murder, rape, and robbery "receive the same or a less severe punishment"; 
(3) "a life sentence is unnecessary and unproductive in terms of rehabilitation]"; and 
(4) "a fifteen year prison term is more proportionate to her crime." Id. at 7-8. 
2
 The Statement of Facts is taken from defendant's statement in support of her 
guilty plea. See R30-39. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) provides: If5 "having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant/' the court "concludes it would be unduly harsh to record 
the conviction as being for the degree of offense established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense," it "may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly." 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to reduce the degree of a conviction for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 32, 25 P.3d 985. The Court 
"'traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide latitude and discretion in sentencing.'" Id. at 
131 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). "Sentencing requires 
such discretion because it necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion 
in sentencing only "when [it] fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the 
sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f^ 31 
(stating that a "sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it is 
inherently unfair or clearly excessive"). A party "faces a heavy burden" when attempting 
to show an abuse of discretion. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004 UT 
80, TJ 35 n.l, 104 P.3d 1185 (describing burden to show an abuse of discretion in context 
of challenge to admissibility of evidence). 
4 
Defendant's first claim is that her sentence was unduly harsh because she had 
"voluntarily participated in counseling while incarcerated," had "expressed a sincere 
desire to address her drug addiction/' and "had never previously been committed to 
prison." Br. Appellant at 7. The trial court considered all of these factors, together with 
other legally relevant factors, before denying defendant's motion to reduce. The court's 
decision, based on all of the factors, is not inherently unfair or clearly excessive. 
At sentencing, defense counsel explained her concerns about a first degree felony 
sentence. She noted that defendant had never been to prison before and argued that a 
first-time prison term of five years to life would offer insufficient flexibility for prison-
induced reform. See ST at 6. "If she goes down there and learns her lesson, if she's on a 
life sentence^] she'll just sit and rot for the second half of that." Id. Defendant explained 
that she had "gotten [herself] into programs at the jail." Id. at 7. She had been "enrolled 
in a substance abuse self-help and [in] some classes through Bear River Health 
Department" and in AA. Id. She entered the programs "[n]ot because [they were] court 
ordered, but because [she] need[ed] the help." Id. at 8. 
The prosecutor, on the other hand, observed that "defendant ha[d] already been 
shown substantial leniency." Id. "One first degree felony was reduced to a third and a 
third first degree felony was dismissed as part of this plea bargain." Id. He noted that 
defendant "ha[d] been well entrenched in the system for a long time," "[b]oth as a 
juvenile and as an adult." Id. at 9. 
The trial judge stated that he had reviewed the presentence report and other reports 
and letters in defendant's case. Id. at 10. He observed that defendant had an 
5 
unsuccessful history in drug court. Id. He noted that she had been placed in "the 
Northern Utah Community Correction Center [NUCCC]" and "went through counseling 
there." Id. at 10, 12. Although she "stayed clean for a little more than a year" following 
her commitment to NUCCC, she returned to her association with drug users and dealers 
and began to use methamphetamine again. Id. at 12. He noted that she had been charged 
with three first degree felonies in connection with three incidents within a nine-month 
period, one occurring "[b]y a public park, by a child care center." Id. at 13. Finally, he 
noted that she had earlier been arrested for child abuse because she was using drugs while 
she was pregnant. Id. 
Based on the circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the 
defendant, as detailed above, the trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce. Id. at 
13. In so doing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant had an extensive 
criminal history; despite treatment in drug court and in jail, she remained an addict; and 
she continued to use and possess drugs with intent to distribute. Moreover, she used and 
possessed them in locations that presented a danger to the public. Thus, the trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant's motion to reduce and instead 
imposed the sentence mandated by statute for the offense of which she was convicted. 
Under the circumstances, that sentence was neither inherently unfair nor excessive. 
Defendant's second, third, and fourth claims, that "it is unduly harsh to sentence 
her to life in prison for a drug charge . . . given that individuals convicted of crimes of a 
more serious nature (murder, rape, robbery[,] etc.) receive the same or a less severe 
punishment," that "a life sentence is unnecessary and unproductive in terms of 
6 
rehabilitation]," and that "a fifteen year prison term is more proportionate to her crime," 
are, when reduced to their essence, claims that the statutory penalties are inappropriate. 
Br. Appellant at 7-8. As noted by the prosecutor, "[t]he legislature has set out the 
punishment in this case." ST at 9. It is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes 
and punishments. See State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, \ 15, 52 P.3d 1276. Absent a 
constitutional challenge, this Court will "not comment on the legislature's wisdom" in 
defining crimes or their punishments." Id.; see also State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 
1377-78 (Utah 1996) (stating that "absent a showing that a particular punishment is 
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate, we are not apt to substitute our judgment for that of 
the legislature regarding the wisdom of a particular punishment or of an entire sentencing 
scheme) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 
414 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[tlhe wisdom and fairness (as opposed to the 
constitutionality) of sentencing statutes . . . is a matter for the legislature, not for the 
courts"). 
Defendant does not question the constitutionality of the statute under which she 
was convicted. She does not claim that the penalties constitute cruel and unusual 
punishments or that they otherwise violate the state or federal constitution. Rather, she 
claims the penalties are "unnecessary and unproductive" and that a shorter term of 
imprisonment would be adequate. Br. Appellant at 8. In making this claim, defendant 
asserts that the sentencing scheme is unwise. The wisdom of the sentencing scheme is, 
7 
however, a policy matter for the legislature. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by not concluding that the penalties were unnecessary and unproductive.3 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court failed to consider all the legally 
relevant factors or that the sentence imposed was inherently unfair or excessive. Thus, 
she has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her section 402 
motion to reduce the degree of her conviction. Defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. / 
Respectfully submitted this 3rJ day of yQi^juJl \~ , 2005. 
,. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
B. INOUYE 
tant Attorney General 
eys for Appellee 
3
 Moreover, with respect to defendant's second claim that her sentence is "unduly 
harsh . . . given that individuals convicted of a crimes of a more serious nature . . . receive 
the same or less severe punishment," the Utah Supreme Court has held that "comparative 
proportionality review [is] not required by either the federal or the state constitution." 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 286 (Utah 1989). "Determining whether the penalty is 
proportionate to the crime requires a careful and thoughtful consideration of the 
individual defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime." Id. at 287. For that 
reason, "[fjocus on the individual defendant and his acts is called for . . . not comparison 
with other criminals and their crimes." Id. Moreover, as noted by this Court, even 
assuming that two sentences are comparatively disproportionate, the problem may not be 
that the harsher sentence was too severe, but that the more lenient sentence was not 
severe enough. See State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, Tf 11, 73 P.3d 991. 
8 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402 Page 1 of 1 
/6-J-4U2. Lorn u I nil iini of lower degree oi otlcnse. 
(Ij If the court ha milk irgard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant 
was found guilty and to the histoiy and character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh 
to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence tin* 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law enter a judgmenl of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and 
impose sentence accordingl) 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree telonj the conuclion is toiisideicil to hi Inn ,i ILJSS V 
misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is 
n iithin the limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is plated on piobjlion iJiclln r 
committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either 
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense ma) be reduced only one degree under this section unless the prosecutor specifically 
agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an 
lffmse be reduced under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person fioni nhtainmj2 oi being yiantnl in 
expungement of his record as provided by law. 
Amended by Chapter 7, 1991 General Session 
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